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Globalizing Political and Economic Elites  
in National Fields of Power 
Christian Schneickert ∗ 
Abstract: »Die Globalisierung politischer und wirtschaftlicher Eliten in nationa-
len Feldern der Macht«. The article contributes to the discussions about global 
elites from a field-theoretical and empirical perspective. The examination of 
comparative biographical data on political and economic elites in two countries 
from the Global North (Germany and the US) and the Global South (Brazil and 
India) shows that elites in all four countries are globalizing. However, this pro-
cess is strongly embedded in specific historic and socio-cultural structures of 
national fields of power. Emerging powers from the “Global South” seem to es-
tablish their own “schools of power” for the educational reproduction of their 
national elites. Therefore, speaking of a homogenous global elite is misleading 
and obscures the multiple conflicts between elite factions in national fields of 
power, as well as between national elites from different countries and world 
regions. Consequently, field-theoretical research on elites must be embedded in 
a comprehensive analysis of power, conflict, and class-relations on the national 
as well as on the global level of the capitalist world system. 
Keywords: Elites, field of power, Bourdieu, globalization, global elite. 
1.  Introduction 
In the context of the economic crisis of the last ten years, capitalist globaliza-
tion has been a key driver of the changing relationship between political and 
economic fields. Economic practices and economists as intersectional field-
agents between such fields consequently gained academic attention (Lebaron 
2001; Maesse 2015; Schmidt-Wellenburg 2017, 2018). This article argues that 
a field-theoretical perspective on economic practices still falls short of provid-
ing a full understanding of the heterogeneous effects of globalization on the 
relation of political and economic fields within fields of power and on different 
analytical levels (e.g., local, national, transnational, or global). An exploratory 
analysis of such field relations has to start with the top positions in fields – the 
field-elites.  
                                                             
∗  Christian Schneickert, Institute for Social Sciences, Department of Macrosociology, 
Zschokkestr. 32, 39104 Magdeburg, Germany; christian.schneickert@ovgu.de. 
HSR 43 (2018) 3  │  330 
Globalization is not a uniform, homogenous, or consistent process. Al-
though neoliberal economic practices are a main driver, globalization in fact 
relies on various non-capitalist and even non-economic structures (Sklair 
2002). Moreover, agents other than elites should be part of a comprehensive 
analysis of the global field of power (Schmitz, Witte and Gengnagel 2017). 
Instead of universal conditions for all nations, the dynamics of globalization 
have rather different effects on states and national societies as well as their 
local contexts (Heredia 2018; Klüger 2018, in this issue). Robertson termed 
this dialectic character of globalization and localization “glocalisation” (Rob-
ertson 1990, 1992; Robertson and White 2003). Nederveen Pieterse made a 
similar argument emphasizing the hybridity of the local and the global against 
the backdrop of an essentialism of identity, ethnicity, and nation (Nederveen 
Pieterse 2004, 65, 71). Surprisingly those discussions from globalization theory 
are almost not connected to elite research yet.  
As actors operating at the intersection of political, economic, and scientific 
fields, economists are highly relevant in fields of power on the national and 
transnational level. Nevertheless, the analysis of political and economic field-
elites itself enhances our understanding of the relation of the central subfields 
within national fields of power. It is only from this specific configuration that 
economic practices and economists unfold their relational relevance. Therefore, 
although I recognize the importance of economists in the field of power I 
would like to argue that we do not focus enough on the political and economic 
fields in themselves as well as their relation to the field of power. Moreover, 
what we still lack from a field-theoretical perspective is a full understanding of 
the relation between (at least) the political, economic, and scientific field in the 
field of power.  
A field-theoretical approach facilitates solutions for some structural issues in 
elite research (Schneickert 2015). First, it tackles elite researchers’ methodo-
logical nationalism that assumes nation-states to be the single most important 
unit of analysis. Second, it criticizes elite researchers’ Eurocentrism, their 
concentration on theories developed in the context of European societies of the 
19th century and their empirical disinterest in non-Western elites. The latter 
precludes a full understanding of the role of elites and inequality in the post-
colonial and multicentric configuration of global capitalism in the 21st century. 
Third, it overcomes the assumed antagonism between structure and agency as 
well as, fourth, the assumed antagonism between the global and the local.  
Scholars agree on the fact that the analysis of transnational class formation 
should start with elites since these social groups accumulated greater amounts 
of different forms of capital than lower social strata, facilitating their transna-
tionalization (Mau and Büttner 2010). In Towards a global ruling class Robin-
son and Harris (2000) argued that the capitalist upper strata from all world 
regions would crystallize into a transnational capitalist class. However, as this 
article shows, the formation of transnational classes is not the only process 
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taking place in a globalized world. In the last 20 years elite research has shown 
that the top position holders are still tied to national contexts in various regards 
and that there are competing forms of elite configuration and of neoliberal 
globalization as well as conflicting configurations on the level of the world-
system. Altogether, this constitutes a superstructure that might be conceptual-
ized as a global field of power.  
This article contributes to this research agenda by exploring the political and 
economic fields within national fields of power from the narrow framework of 
elite research. Drawing on biographic data regarding top politicians and top 
executives in four countries, focusing on social structure and globalization, it 
will show that the impact of globalization is context-specific. Therefore, glob-
alization has to be theoretically reframed as a macro-development that has to 
adapt to historic, cultural, and field-specific structures on the national level as 
well as the micro-level of actors. The paper first summarizes the current debate 
between the two contradicting positions on global and national elites. Subse-
quently, comparative data from the four countries are presented showing that 
there are indeed processes of convergence and standardization but also that 
local, cultural, historic, and field-specific structures still carry a lot of weight. 
Finally, the analysis of national field-structures is further elaborated and visual-
ized using multiple correspondence analysis (MCA). 
2.  The Myth of the Global Elite 
At first glance, the idea of a global elite in the making is intriguing, especially 
regarding the acceleration of capitalist globalization with the increasing con-
centration of wealth and power in ever fewer hands. In his work The state 
nobility, Bourdieu (1996) contends that the consolidation of the French national 
ruling class was historically based on a process of cultural standardization. 
Regarding globalization, it is an interesting question whether a similar process 
takes place on the transnational level today.  
The globalization debate (cf. Waters 1995; Therborn 2000; Stiglitz 2002; 
Sklair 2006; Scholte 2000; Rehbein 2011; Robertson 1990, 1992; Robertson 
and White 2003) has inspired social theory and has redirected elite research 
away from the prior antagonism between functionalist and conflict-theoretical 
approaches to the discussion of the global power structure. In the last 20 years 
a new theoretical antagonism in this area of research emerged with the devel-
opment of two ideal-typical positions.  
On the one hand, scholars who advocate the global elite hypothesis argue 
that elites and upper classes are in the avant-garde of transnational class for-
mation, transcending the borders of the nation state (Field 1972; Marceau 
1989a, 1989b; Albrow 1996; Kanter 1997; Robinson and Harris 2000; Sklair 
2001; Kentor and Jang 2004; Rothkopf 2008). It is further argued that this 
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detachment from local or national limitations can be transferred into power and 
influence. Regarding this power shift to the transnational level, national politics 
and the welfare state are increasingly under pressure.  
On the other hand, scholars have shown in a number of empirical studies 
that the concrete agents of those macro developments remain national in im-
portant aspects of their biographies, first and foremost regarding socio-cultural 
aspects and educational as well as career paths (Hartmann 2000, 2007b; 
Beaverstock 2002; Beaverstock, Hubbard and Short 2004; Carroll 2010). Such 
empirical studies often focus on the micro-level of actors and tend to leave the 
macro-level and the intersection of (field) structures and (habitual) agencies 
aside. However, the empirical findings generally refer to the importance of 
national differences and basic structures of the national social spaces for the 
constitution of individual and class habitus. In this context Schwengel argued 
that the exclusiveness of national upper class habitus is – in contrast to the 18th 
century European ruling class – rather an obstacle to transnational class for-
mation (Schwengel 2004). The debate became more moderate, objective, and 
well founded in empirical research in recent years (cf. Carroll 2010; Hartmann 
2015; Schneickert 2015). Obviously, globalization decisively shapes the 21st 
century, national welfare states and borders are under pressure and transnational 
corporations and their executives share a common interest in the functioning of 
a globally operating capitalist world economy. However, common interests and 
network structures do not necessarily imply formation of similar (globalized) 
habitus (Schneickert 2013) or transnational lifestyles (Sklair 2001, 20).  
The idea of a highly globalized elite on the one hand and a demobilized and 
increasingly marginalized part of the population on the other hand is a populist 
fiction. At the beginning of the 21st century, Huntington (2004) predicted that 
the cleavage between the cosmopolitan liberal elite and the nationalism of the 
American population would become the major political division in the US. 
Castells (1998, 415) coined the phrase: “elites are cosmopolitan, people are 
local.” The election of Donald Trump has further sparked this debate and the 
discussion on nationalism worldwide established this theme in discourses re-
garding political fields. However, this idea obscures an important part of the 
empirical reality. Not only are working and middle classes not per se excluded 
from transnational practices and mobility (e.g., regarding migration, tourism, 
studying abroad, etc., cf. Weiß 2005) they might even profit from transnational 
practices, although the distribution of transnational capital obviously has a 
social gradient (Gerhards and Hans 2013; Delhey, Deutschmann and Cirlanaru 
2015). Moreover, what we usually refer to as globalization is in fact an increase 
in the mobility of capital and global production as well as the mobility of people 
between certain places, like global cities (Sassen 1991; Carroll 2010, 68-75) or 
within world-regions (Delhey et al. 2014; Deutschmann 2016). At the same 
time, even transnational networks of elites rely on strong national bases 
(Carroll and Fennema 2002, 2004; Carroll 2010). 
HSR 43 (2018) 3  │  333 
Furthermore, the strong focus on social structural divides and on economic 
globalization partly ignores the complex relation between differentiation and 
globalization. From a field-theoretical perspective, there are distinctions be-
tween how field-elites (the political elite, the economic elite, the artistic elite, 
the scientific elite, etc.) adapt to globalization according to their relational 
position in national fields of power. This was a central point in Marxist ap-
proaches to globalization, prominently in Wallerstein’s world-system-theory 
(1979) but was largely neglected by (functionalist) differentiation theory in 
elite research.  
Integrating power, conflict, inequality, and differentiation is a key feature of 
Bourdieusian field-theory but similar attempts can be found in the works on 
transnational class formation as well (Sklair 2001; Carroll 2010). Theoretically, 
this leads to the relation of micro- and macrostructures. While the integration 
of agents and structures is constitutive for Bourdieusian field-theory, it is often 
regarded as mutually exclusive in elite research and research on globalization. 
For example, globalization theory usually focuses on macro processes while 
sociology of transnationalism emphasizes the role of agents. I have argued 
elsewhere (Schneickert 2015) that both research traditions would benefit from a 
field-theoretical perspective, integrating the dialectics of habitus and field. 
Regarding globalization, the structural and organizational levels (e.g., markets, 
financial flows, discourses, etc.) obviously globalize faster than the individual 
and biographic levels of socialization as well as educational and career pat-
terns. But even this is only part of the globalization story. Of course, capitalist 
corporations follow an instrumental rationality and therefore share an interest 
in maximizing profits in global markets. But when it comes to everyday prac-
tices or ownership structures, the recruitment of top position-holders and trans-
national networks, national patterns are still very important (Carroll and 
Fennema 2002, 415; Carroll 2010, 18).  
A major theoretical and empirical flaw in the debate about global elites is its 
strong focus on either (globalized) structures or (national) actors and their 
biographies. Furthermore, the multiple conflicts and heterogeneities between 
national elites from different world regions are usually ignored. Quite the con-
trary, a field theoretical approach to globalization highlights exactly the multi-
dimensionality and field-specific differentiation of globalization processes. 
That is, the globalization hypothesis is not falsified because the trajectories of 
elites are predominantly national. On the other hand, the existence of a global 
elite is not verified just because there are global financial flows, global markets, 
and interests in an operating capitalist world economy. Empirically we find 
globalized elites in national fields of power and vice versa national trajectories 
in transnational or globalized fields. Therefore, a field-theoretical approach to 
globalization urges to be much more cautious with actor-centered indicators on 
the one hand, but also not to define globalization as mere macro-development 
without concrete agents on the other hand.  
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Although empirical elite research from its beginning in the 1960s (cf. 
Edinger and Searing 1967) showed that national differences are important, 
comparative elite research on the international and transnational level is not 
institutionalized academically yet (Hoffmann-Lange 2007, 920). Table 1 com-
pares findings from four international comparative studies on the globalization 
of economic elites, covering data from 1995 to 2015.  
Table 1: Globalization of Economic Elites (in Percent) 
 Hartmann 1999 Hartmann 2009 Pohlmann 2009 Hartmann 
2015 
 I II II I II+III I II III I II+III 
Germany 2 15 14 9 36.3 - 22.1 27.6 14.7 47.1 
France 2 13 6 2 18.1 - - - 4.0 26.0 
UK 7 12 14 18 18.9 - - - 33.0 23.9 
USA 3 2 7 5 9.5 - - - 6.9 17.0 
Japan - - - 1 - 2 21.8 40.0 1.0 - 
China - - - 0 - 0 7.1 9.1 0.0 - 
South 
Korea 
- - - - - 2 30.0 43.3 - - 
I=Foreign CEOs; II=Studying abroad; III=Working abroad. Own Calculations according to 
Hartmann 1999, 118; 2009a, 289; 2015, 40-1; Pohlmann 2009, 520; see Schneickert 2015, 103. 
 
The data indicate a clear trend towards globalization over time but this process 
is overall much slower and more moderate than is usually assumed in the litera-
ture. Furthermore, strong national differences can be found, with German and 
British economic elites significantly more globalized than elites in France, the 
US, or China. As the table further indicates, most available data are on North-
American and European elites, although there is a growing interest in Asian 
and Latin American countries but unfortunately almost no systematic data on 
African Elites. 
The analysis of biographical data is predominant in elite research with a 
special focus on educational reproduction and career patterns (Bauer and Ber-
tin-Mourot 1999; Mayer and Whittington 1999; Hartmann 2007a; Davoine and 
Ravasi 2013). If structural data are analyzed at all, the analysis usually focuses 
on attendance at elite schools and universities.  
In summary, the main findings of international comparative elite research 
have enhanced the understanding of differences between national configurations 
according to national social structures (e.g., class structures and social spaces). 
Although all elites are socially exclusive and recruit themselves mostly from 
the upper strata of the (national) social spaces, countries can be differentiated 
according to the organization of this reproduction function. While some coun-
tries rely on institutionalized cultural capital with decisive educational elite 
institutions (e.g., France, the UK, the US, or Japan), others do not have well-
known institutions such as the Grandes Écoles, the Ivy League Universities, or 
“Oxbridge” and rely mostly on incorporated cultural capital and habitus as the 
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dominant mode of reproduction (e.g., Germany, Italy, Austria) (cf. Hartmann 
2007a).  
Furthermore, the specific relation of field-elites, the degree of horizontal dif-
ferentiation, and the autonomy of fields differ between countries. It appears 
that the configuration of field-elites is associated with the specific socio-
cultural style of differentiation in a society. To systematically analyze such 
configurations from a comparative perspective, this paper focuses on the top 
positions of society in two fields that are considered central to the power struc-
ture of most contemporary societies (Bühlmann, David and Mach 2012a): the 
economic and the political field.  
3. Comparative Analysis of Elites in Four Countries 
The following analyses are based on biographical data of top politicians and 
top executives in Brazil, Germany, India, and the US (N=336), collected in 
2013. The country sample contrasts elites from two leading countries from the 
Global North (G8) and the Global South (BRICS) that are as heterogeneous as 
possible regarding the globalization of their elites. Therefore, the US and Brazil 
were chosen to cover the most national type of elite configuration, whereas 
India and Germany were expected to provide more globalized fields of political 
and economic elites.  
Field specific positions were selected according to the positional approach 
[Table 2].  
Table 2:  Positional Sampling 




Chief Executive Officers 
(CEO) 
President · Vice-President · President of 
Câmara dos Deputados · President Senate · 
President Supremo Tribunal Federal · 
Chefe da Casa Civil · Ministers (24) 
Germany 
(N=81) 
Chief Executive Officers 
(CEO) 
President · Chancelor · Ministers (15) · 
Parliament (Bundestag: President ·  




Managing Directors (MD) or 
Chief Executive Officers 
(CEO) 
President · Prime Minister · Vice President 
· Lok Sabha (Speaker, Deputy Speaker, 






Chief Executive Officers 
(CEO) 
President · Vice-President · Ministers (22) · 
Senate (President, Majority Leader, 
Minority Leader) · House of  
Representatives (Speaker, Majority  
Leader, Minority Leader) 
 
Regarding the economic (corporate) elite, positions were selected according to 
the Forbes Global 2000 ranking (2013), choosing the largest corporations from 
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the four countries in this list. The Forbes ranking is the best ranking available 
on a global level, although it certainly has its flaws from a strictly methodolog-
ical perspective. The list is based predominantly on four indicators (sales, prof-
its, assets, and market value) and is restricted to the largest public companies. 
For a reconstruction of the economic field in general, the Forbes list would 
certainly be insufficient as it focuses heavily on the top layer of corporations, 
which makes it adequate for the purpose of this paper. Nonetheless, national 
rankings were counter-checked to rule out the possibility of not taking into 
account important national corporations. However, all national corporations 
were already included in the Global 2000 sample. US companies were strongly 
overrepresented in the list, and therefore the number of US corporations was 
restricted to 75. For the other countries, all Global 2000 corporations were 
included: 55 from India, 49 from Germany, and 31 from Brazil. The combina-
tion of a national sample based on the Global 2000 ranking with a restriction of 
US-corporations is consistent with the considerations of Carroll and Fennema 
(2004) regarding the dominance of US corporations in the capitalist world 
system. This argument was criticized by Kentor und Jang (2004, 358) regard-
ing research designs focusing on global elites and the global power structure. 
Therefore, researchers have to focus either on the North-South-divide or on 
global elites in the global power structure. However, for the international com-
parative aim of the paper at hand the chosen approach is appropriate as no 
conclusions will be drawn from this dataset on the (existing or non-existing) 
global elite.  
Regarding political elites, the determination of the most relevant positions is 
well founded in the literature on political systems in Brazil (e.g., Fontaine and 
Stehnken 2014), Germany (e.g., Rudzio 2011), India (e.g., Jayal and Mehta 
2010) and the US (e.g., Edwards, Wattenberg and Lineberry 2010). 
All data were collected in August 2013, predominantly from published 
sources (e.g., forbes.com; reuters.com; bloomberg.com; governmental and 
personal websites, etc.). Since information on managers from India and Brazil 
from published sources was insufficient, a survey of CEOs and chairpersons of 
81 identified corporations in the two countries was conducted in fall 2013 to 
add additional information to the dataset (see Schneickert 2015 for more in-
formation).  
The sampling procedure is not neutral, especially regarding elite positions 
(Bourdieu 1996, 234). For example, the sample size cannot be increased with-
out having a loss of exclusivity in the sample. Therefore, elite research usually 
suffers from small sample sizes. Moreover, information on elites is sometimes 
difficult to gather and therefore missing values are another big issue. On the 
other hand, missing values in elite research are not only a matter of data quality, 
rather they can indicate power differences and specific field rules (for example, 
usually more personal information on top politicians is available than on corpo-
rate managers). This seriously restricts the possibilities for advanced multivariate 
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analysis. In this context, MCA provides explorative and descriptive analytical 
power for field-theoretical elite research. However, focusing only the top posi-
tion-holders of the political and economic subfields of national fields of power 
brings other restrictions. A comprehensive analysis of the field of power would 
certainly include other positions, structures, and discourses. Some of the large-
scale elite studies went in this direction, covering different sectors of societies 
and assuming the power elite in a moderate sized nation state to include some 
1,000 to 4,000 individuals (for the case of Germany see Bürklin and Rebenstorf 
1997; WZB 2013). Therefore, the following comparative analysis of fields of 
political and economic elites can be understood as explorative analysis of na-
tional fields of power. 
Four indicators are frequently used to operationalize the transnationalization 
of elites [see Table 3]: Number of non-citizens (binary, multiple citizenship is 
coded as ‘non-citizen’), migration background (binary, born and/or raised in 
another country), studied abroad and worked abroad (binary, >3 month). Be-
side standard sociodemographic information, parent’s occupation was coded 
into a five-class-scheme (lower class, lower middle class, upper middle class, 
upper class, and elite, see Table 14 in the appendix). Academization is a binary 
variable measuring if the person holds at least an undergraduate degree. Overall 
the elites are highly ‘overeducated,’ as we find over 100 different higher educa-
tion degrees for the 336 biographies analyzed. The disciplines of law, economics 
and engineering as well as the degrees Master of Business Administration 
(MBA) and PhD are most relevant for the field elites under research. Therefore 
binary variables for those disciplines were coded as well. The variables in-
house career, branch career, and field career measure the degree to which indi-
viduals changed position during their career. While in-house career and branch 
career applies to the economic elites only, field career measures if a person 
changed the macro-field of occupation in general (e.g., from science to politics, 
from politics to the economy, etc.). These variables are binary coded as well. 
Table 3 presents descriptive results, indicating national and field specific 
differences, but also some similarities between structures of national elite con-
figurations. Overall, the male domination of elite positions is striking, but a 
closer look reveals strong differences between the fields, with the lowest num-
ber of women in the German economic elite. The elites are usually married 
(with the Brazilian elite being a slight dissenter in this regard) and recruit 
themselves from the upper strata of the national social spaces. Regarding social 
background, national and field-specific differences appear with elites in Brazil 
and India being more exclusive and the German political elite with the highest 
number of individuals from lower and middle classes.  
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 







 PE EE PE EE PE EE PE EE 
Female 
13% 12% 9% 14% 
20% 7% 28% 2% 11% 7% 30% 8% 
Age  
(mean) 
58 (sd=10.5) 55 (sd=7.3) 61 (sd=8.7) 59 (sd=7.7) 
61 55 55 55 67 57 59 59 
Married 
84% 92% 98% 99% 
82% 88% 81% 100% 97% 100% 97% 100% 
Children 
(mean) 
2.5 (sd=1) 2.2 (sd=1.5) 2.4 (sd=1.3) 2.6 (sd=1.1) 
2.7 2.2 1.8 2.6 2.5 1.9 2.5 2.8 
Upper Class & 
Elite Origin 
83% 48% 76% 55% 
83% 83% 29% 65% 79% 72% 55% 56% 
Academization 
93% 93% 99% 99% 
93% 93% 88% 96% 97% 100% 100% 97% 
Law 
19% 34% 27% 20% 
39% 0% 50% 24% 52% 10% 45% 10% 
Economics 
48% 31% 55% 55% 
23% 73% 25% 35% 27% 73% 24% 68% 
MBA 
21% 8% 21% 28% 
0% 42% 4% 11% 6% 31% 10% 35% 
Engineering 
27% 22% 22% 20% 
8% 46% 0% 35% 6% 33% 10% 25% 
PhD 
18% 47% 6% 9% 
33% 2% 41% 51% 11% 2% 10% 8% 
In-house 
Career - 30% - 21% - 41% - 39% 
Branch  
Career - 80% - 63% - 93% - 78% 
Inter-Field 
Career 
19% 14% 10% 14% 
24% 14% 25% 6% 14% 7% 50% 0% 
Studied  
Abroad 
27% 25% 26% 11% 
19% 35% 9% 35% 19% 31% 10% 11% 
Worked 
Abroad 
19% 30% 18% 15% 
14% 23% 3% 48% 26% 13% 10% 18% 
Migration 
5% 13% 2% 11% 
3% 8% 6% 17% 0% 5% 7% 14% 
Non-Citizens 
5% 11% 1% 10% 
3% 7% 0% 19% 0% 2% 10% 10% 
PE=Political Elite; EE=Economic Elite. 
 
From a Bourdieusian perspective, the relevance of cultural capital for the legit-
imation of elite positions is most relevant. Field specific institutions for elite-
recruitment are decisive for the analysis of the field of power. Although in 
Bourdieu’s work the concept is peculiarly fuzzy and largely restricted to the 
national frame, it can certainly be modified and expanded beyond the nation 
state (Buchholz 2016; Schmitz, Witte and Gengnagel 2017). Nevertheless, the 
focus on elite schools like the French Grandes Écoles and the top executives is 
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certainly not by accident (Bourdieu 1996). The nexus of meritocratic legitima-
tion by cultural capital, elite positions, and power structures is historically a 
very European configuration. In this context, Table 3 surprisingly indicates no 
significant differences between the four countries regarding academization. 
Furthermore, the dominance of only a few academic disciplines, especially the 
trio of law, economics, and engineering for elite recruitment is well known, 
following the hierarchical structure of the faculties in the academic field 
(Bourdieu 1988 [1984]). The relevance of those disciplines can be found in the 
present data as well, as Figure 1 indicates. Obviously, the dominance of lawyers, 
economists, and engineers in the elite is not specific to elite configurations in 
Europe or the Global North and neither is the overrepresentation of lawyers in 
the political elites and economists and engineers in the economic elites [Table 3]. 
Figure 1:  Degrees in Either Engineering, Economics, or Law (EEL) (in Percent, 
N=306) 
 
Regarding cultural capital, the data suggest the expansion of a certain way of 
legitimizing executive power in the context of capitalist globalization. It is 
important that this process of convergence concerns meritocracy only as a 
social construction. It says little about the quality or qualifications of top position-
holders (Davoine and Ravasi 2013, 156-7) – especially in an international or 
historical comparison – and almost nothing about their democratic legitimation. 
From a field-theoretical perspective one has to be aware that field-specific 
educational and career patterns play an important role for field-socialization 
and therefore for the autonomy of fields. This differentiation-theoretical aspect 
might be a reason for the persistence of the national character of such patterns.  
However, Table 4 shows no strong accumulation of schools of power com-
parable to the French Grandes Écoles analyzed by Bourdieu. In all four coun-
tries studied, the data do not suggest a significant concentration on certain elite 
institutions. Just the combination of Ivy League universities (supplemented by 
Stanford and MIT) reaches significant numbers, hosting almost half of the US-
elites in the present sample. Beside this combination, only Harvard as single 
institution stands out. Apparently, the representation of educational institutions 
69 64
76 72















Political Elites Economic Elites
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is not fully congruent with national educational rankings. For example, in the 
case of the US, other non-Ivy League schools besides Stanford and MIT con-
sistently rank among the top 20 and Princeton competed with Harvard for the 
number one position in the last years. 
The weak concentration of German educational institutions is rather unsur-
prising as the university system traditionally consists of federal public institu-
tions with no elite institutions standing out. However, with the universities of 
Göttingen, Munich, Münster, and Freiburg being the once most frequently 
mentioned, at least some of the oldest and most prestigious institutions from 
South-West-Germany appear. The Technical University in Munich certainly 
has some relevance for the technological fraction of the economic elite. How-
ever, as the current German elites were predominantly born between 1945 and 
1965 and received their education in the 1970s and 1980s, recent government 
program to establish German elite universities (the ‘Exzellenzinitiative’) did not 
play a considerable role until now.  
Although no schools of power in the sense of the Grandes Écoles can be de-
tected, a much denser concentration of institutions appears in Brazil. The 
Fundação Getúlio Vargas is a prestigious higher education institution, also 
well-known as public and private management think tank. The Universidade de 
São Paulo (USP) is the largest public university and the most prestigious and 
internationally best known higher education institution in Brazil. For the Bra-
zilian economic elite, especially the engineering school (Escola Politécnica) is 
of relevance, but USP is also the alma mater of 12 Brazilian presidents. The 
private pontifical universities in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo play an overall 
minor role but they are nonetheless important for the political elite and elites of 
the civil society with a disciplinary focus on law, social sciences, and philoso-
phy. Similarly, the Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ) as the 
largest public federal university in Brazil is known as the center of the intellec-
tual elite (see also Klüger 2018). 
A similar division of labor in the field of power is observable for the Indian 
elites. Especially the lose network of the National Institutes of Technology 
(NIT) and the Indian Institutes of Technology (IIT) as autonomous public 
“institution of national importance” plays some role for the recruitment of the 
technological fraction of the Indian economic elite. On the other hand political 
elites most likely graduate in law at Delhi University, while the financial frac-
tions focus on degrees from Mumbai University or the Indian Institute for 
Banking and Finance (IIBF). While IIBF predominantly offers graduate cours-
es in professional education, Mumbai University is one of the largest educa-
tional institutions in the world with over 500,000 students. Regarding these 
numbers, however, there is obviously a stark difference between these institu-
tions and the French schools of power described by Bourdieu. 
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Table 4: Educational Institutions 
Brazil 
Fundação Getúlio Vargas (Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo) 22%
Universidade de São Paulo (USP) 18%
Pontifícia Universidade Católica (RJ and São Paulo) 16%
Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ) 9%
 
Germany 
University of Göttingen 11%
University of Munich 9%
University of Münster 9%
University of Freiburg 8%
 
India 
NIT / IIT (different locations) 13%
University of Delhi 13%
International Institute of Banking and Finance (IIBF) 13%






Ivy League + MIT + Stanford 46%
 
Overall, it is striking that educational institutions in Brazil and India appear to 
provide a stronger concentration of national elite education in only a few insti-
tutions (on an overall low level though). Quite to the contrary, the case of the 
US elite institutions clearly also refers to the level of the global field of power. 
Harvard is a national school of power but it is also a global institution. There-
fore, studying in such an institution cannot simply be taken as indicator for the 
nationalization of elites. This leads to the central claim of this paper that will be 
developed in the following section. Elite configurations do not only differ 
according to historical, socio-cultural, or field-specific structures but also re-
garding the position of the nation state in the world-system (Wallerstein 1979). 
For an international comparative elite study, I suggest operationalizing the 
political and economic fields and their elites as central indicators of national 
fields of power.  
4.   National Fields of Power and Globalizing Elites 
Bourdieu’s conception of a field of power was further elaborated in elite re-
search in recent years (cf. Hjellbrekke et al. 2007; Bühlmann, David and Mach 
2012a, 2012b, 2013; Schneickert 2015; Beri and Schneickert 2016; Denord, 
Lagneau-Ymonet and Thine 2018; Naudet, Allorant and Ferry 2018). The 
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concept of social fields has the potential to overcome the antagonism between 
(functionalist) differentiation theory and (Marxist) conflict theory in elite re-
search. This theoretical antagonism has prevented an integrative analysis of 
political and economic field-elites, situated in their specific social fields respec-
tively. Bühlmann et al. developed this approach with their groundbreaking 
work on the fields of the political and economic elites of Switzerland (Bühl-
mann, David and Mach 2012a) with a special focus on the globalization of the 
Swiss elites (Bühlmann, David and Mach 2013). Field-theoretical elite research 
integrates those different theoretical schools with a special focus on conflicts, 
inequalities, and power structures. In the following, the article uses a similar 
approach to conceptualize fields of the economic and political elite from a 
comparative perspective and a special focus on differentiation, education, ca-
reer patterns, and globalization of both field-elites. Methodologically, field 
theory is a comparative approach. It focuses on specific cases but allows to 
conceptualize general patterns. In the following, a MCA for each of the four 
countries is presented. 
Regarding globalization, actor-centered indicators dominate for the empiri-
cal operationalization. In the present data, the four indicators of globalization 
correlate moderately, with the strongest association between number of non-
citizens and migration background [see Table 5 in the appendix]. For the MCA, 
using only those variables unsurprisingly results in a one-dimensional solution 
for all four countries. 
In The state nobility, Bourdieu (1996, 351) used MCA to explore the “prop-
erties” of top executives and the homology of the field of Grandes Écoles and 
the field of power. However, the present paper uses the possibility in MCA to 
distinguish between active and passive variables for theoretical reasons but also 
for reasons regarding the structure of the data (e.g., field specific missing values). 
The trajectories of the agents will serve as active variables, while sociodemo-
graphic and field specific data will be included as passive (illustrative) varia-
bles. This allows to integrate political and economic elites within a field of 
power. Moreover, since it is theoretically argued that educational and career 
patterns are most relevant for the globalization of elites, such variables – to-
gether with the indicators of globalization – will serve as active variables, 
constructing these fields. Variables containing social structural information 
(e.g., gender, class, marital status, children, regional origin) and field-specific 
information (e.g., the sampling variable, party affiliation, Forbes Global 2000 
corporation rank, corporation headquarter, branch) are integrated as illustrative 
(passive) variables in the analysis. Field specific variables therefore are coded 0 
for the other field elite, respectively, instead of missing. Since those variables 
are included as passives, they do not construct the space and therefore avoid a 
differentiation bias. The same procedure was used to include a (binary) sam-
pling variable that helps to illustrate the relative position of the political and 
economic field-elites in the MCAs. Regarding the socio-demographic varia-
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bles, missing values are a serious issue (in this case especially regarding class 
background, of course). Furthermore, the missing information is obviously not 
randomly distributed (for example, less information is available on the eco-
nomic elite). Since MCA is highly sensitive to outliers and missing values, the 
missing values were integrated as own category and the variables are only 
included as passives. The structure of the data is far from perfect in this regard, 
but otherwise some of the socio-demographic information could not have been 
integrated at all. Nevertheless, the interpretation of the position of those passive 
variables should be done with great caution. 
Figure 2 illustrates the field of political and economic elites in Germany. 
Educational and career patterns as well as globalization shape the first (hori-
zontal) dimension of the field. Studying law, the University of Göttingen, and 
inter-field careers are clustered at the pole of the political elite on the left side 
of the space, while working abroad as well as non-citizens and field careers 
concentrate at the pole of the economic elite on the right side of the plane.  
The second axis largely represents the internal differentiation of the eco-
nomic elite with engineers in the upper section and economists in the lower 
section of the field. All globalization variables contribute to the horizontal axis; 
therefore, the differentiation of the field-elites is associated to a differentiation 
between the national and the globalized pole in the field. Studying abroad 
contributes to both axes equally, tending towards the economist and financial 
fraction of the German economic elite. On the right side of the plane, the glob-
alized pole of the economic elite is internally differentiated. While the German 
economic elite is highly globalized in total and especially compared to the 
political elite, the economist fraction is slightly more globalized than the tech-
nological fraction. 
Interestingly, a PhD slightly tends to the pole of the economic elite and re-
flects the high number of German executives with a doctorate. Overall, the 
German case shows a clear differentiation of the field-elites that is associated 
with a differentiation according to globalization. The political elite builds a 
concentrated cluster at the national pole located on the left side of the space, 
while the economic elite is internally differentiated between engineers and 
economists and is located at the globalized pole at the right side of the space. 
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Figure 2: The Field of Political and Economic Elites in Germany (2013, MCA) 
 
N=79. Explained variance on F1 and F2: 59.8% (based on the modified rates of the Eigenvalues). 
See Table 6 and Table 7 in the appendix for information on Eigenvalues, modified rates, and 
contributions of active variables. Bold=Contribution above average on F1, F2. 
Active variables (all binary): law, engineering, economics, PhD, universities (>5%), field career, 
work abroad, study abroad, non-citizen.  
Passive variables: party, Forbes Global 2000 corporation rank, branch (>5%), headquarter of 
corporation (>5%), field, female, age (>50, 50-59, 60+), marital status, children (none, 1-2, 
3+), class background (lower, lower middle, upper middle, upper, elite), regional origin (North 
Germany, West Germany, East Germany, South Germany, not from Germany). 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the same variables for the Brazilian elites. The structure of 
the field is less clear-cut than is the case in Germany, with the indicators of 
globalization exclusively determining the second (vertical) axis [Table 5]. The 
first axis distinguishes between engineers, economists, and field careers on the 
left side and lawyers, PhD-holders, and the University of Brasilia on the right 
side. However, the differentiation of political and economic elites contributes 
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Figure 3:  The Field of Political and Economic Elites in Brazil (2013, MCA) 
 
N=50. Explained variance on F1 and F2: 51.6% (based on the modified rates of the Eigenvalues). 
See Table 8 and Table 9 in the appendix for information on Eigenvalues, modified rates, and 
contributions of active variables. Bold=Contribution above average on F1, F2. 
Active variables (all binary): law, engineering, economics, PhD, universities (>5%), field career, 
work abroad, study abroad, non-citizen.  
Passive variables: party, Forbes Global 2000 corporation rank, branch (>5%), headquarter of 
corporation (>5%), field, female, age (>50, 50-59, 60+), marital status, children (none, 1-2, 
3+), class background (lower, lower middle, upper middle, upper, elite), regional origin (Cen-
tral-West, North-East, South, South-East, not from Brazil). 
 
The spatial structure indicates again a neighborhood of the political elite and 
lawyers as well as inter-field careers. The economic elite seems to be quite 
integrated, as the dense cluster on the central left side shows, indicating a prox-
imity of the banking sector, Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV), and Univer-
sidade de São Paulo (USP) education. Notably this financial cluster of the 
economic field elite is not located at the globalized pole of the field. The dif-
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universities contribute to different degrees to the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth 
dimension (not displayed) as well, but those patterns cannot be interpreted in a 
meaningful way.  
Taken together, the Brazilian field is more integrated with the political and the 
economic elite being separated only slightly by academic education (law versus 
economics and engineering) and the autonomy of field careers. However, this 
separation is not as clearly affected by globalization as it is in the German case.  
Figure 4: The Field of Political and Economic Elites in India (2013, MCA) 
 
N=75. Explained variance on F1 and F2: 51% (based on the modified rates of the Eigenvalues). 
See Table 10 and Table 11 in the appendix for information on Eigenvalues, modified rates, and 
contributions of active variables. Bold=Contribution above average on F1, F2, F3. 
Active variables (all binary): law, engineering, economics, PhD, universities (>5%), field career, 
work abroad, study abroad.  
Passive variables: non-citizen, party, Forbes Global 2000 corporation rank, branch (>5%), 
headquarter of corporation (>5%), field, female, age (>50, 50-59, 60+), marital status, children 
(none, 1-2, 3+), class background (lower, lower middle, upper middle, upper, elite), regional 
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A quite different picture emerges for the Indian elites [Figure 4]. Unlike for the 
other countries, the MCA facilitates a three dimensional solution in this case 
(F1: 32%, F2: 18%, F3: 14%). Figure 4 illustrates the first two axes, but the 
third dimension is interpreted as well [see Table 11 in the appendix]. The first 
(horizontal) axis indicates a difference between disciplines and educational 
institutions (University of Mumbai, engineering, and economics on the left and 
University of Delhi, Panjab University, and law on the right) according to the 
differentiation of the field-elites (with the political elite clearly located on the 
right side). Again studying law is associated with the political elite.  
The second axis includes working abroad, studying abroad as well as inter-
field career and PhD in the upper half, and the Indian Institute of Banking and 
Finance (IIBF) and field careers in the lower half.  
A third dimension captures the nexus of economics, engineering, and some 
universities (especially the NITs and IITs). It probably reflects the relevance of 
the technological fraction in the Indian economic elite. In Figure 4 this cluster 
is located on the upper left side, while on the lower left-hand side the financial 
pole appears.  
Overall, the scattered distribution of the globalization variables is striking. 
Unlike in the other countries, the economic elite is not located clearly at a 
globalized pole. Studying abroad is fairly near to the political elite, but working 
abroad is even closer. Non-citizens and migration background tend to be asso-
ciated more with the economic pole. However, due to the low number of non-
citizens and almost no persons with migration background these two variables 
were set to passive to avoid outlier bias for the construction of the field. Caste 
affiliation was excluded from the analysis for similar methodological reasons 
(resulting from non-random missing information).  
Taken together, the Indian case demonstrates the different impact of globali-
zation in local fields. Whereas it is assumed that economic elites are usually 
more globalized, in this case we see an Indian political elite that is highly en-
gaged in transnational activities. These results suggest that the political field in 
India (at least at this time, in 2013) rewarded the accumulation of transnational 
capital. In contrast to the political elites in Germany and the USA, engaging in 
such international institutions was beneficial for Indian politicians and could be 
transferred to national political capital and position.  
Figure 5 presents a contrasting situation, illustrating the field of political and 
economic elites in the USA. Here, the first axis is largely determined by the 
globalization variables (with the globalized pole on the right side) and Colum-
bia University on the left side. The second (vertical) axis illustrates a cluster 
containing Harvard, Yale, lawyers, holding a PhD, and inter-field careers in the 
upper section and another one in the lower section including economists, engi-
neers, and a Wharton School education. The differentiation of the field-elites is 
tied to this dimension with the political elite on the upper left and the economic 
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elite on the lower right side. The differentiation of the field-elites is not as 
clear-cut as in the German case, but still visible. The strong contribution of 
inter-field careers to this dimension results from the remarkable fact that a 
change of fields appears exclusively for the US political elite. 
Figure 5:  The Field of Political and Economic Elites in the USA (2013, MCA) 
 
N=94. Explained variance on F1 and F2: 58.7% (based on the modified rates of the Eigenvalues). 
See Table 12 and Table 13 in the appendix for information on Eigenvalues, modified rates, and 
contributions of active variables. Bold=Contribution above average on F1, F2. 
Active variables (all binary): law, engineering, economics, PhD, universities (>5%), field career, 
work abroad, study abroad, non-citizen.  
Passive variables: party, Forbes Global 2000 corporation rank, branch (>5%), headquarter of 
corporation (>5%), field, female, age (>50, 50-59, 60+), marital status, children (none, 1-2, 
3+), class background (lower, lower middle, upper middle, upper, elite), regional origin (East, 
North, North-East, South, West, not from the USA), Ivy League (+ Stanford + MIT). 
 
Turning now to the aspect of globalization, it seems notable that the globaliza-
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vertical axis); rather, they determine a relatively separated horizontal dimen-
sion. In summary, the field analysis suggests that the field of the political and 
economic elite in the US reflects its position as the hegemon in the world-
system. This regards especially the role of Harvard located at the national pole 
of the field as a national “school of power” but simultaneously constituting a 
global institution of elite recruitment. Within the US-field, however, globaliza-
tion is not tied to specific elite fractions, educational, or career patterns. 
Table 5: Aggregated Contributions of Groups of Variables 
 Brazil Germany USA India 
 F1 F2 F1 F2 F1 F2 F1 F2 F3 
EEL 30,7% 6,5% 36,9% 45,2% 9,4% 31,6% 53,3% 6,7% 39,2% 
Univer-
sities 
25,2% 5,5% 21,9% 40,3% 0,6% 3,0% 39,1% 45,4% 38,9% 
PhD 18,3% 4,3% 2,8% 1,5% 6,1% 26,3% 5,8% 17,1% 0,1% 
Field 
Career 
12,3% 1,1% 8,3% 0,0% 0,8% 30,9% 0,2% 25,1% 11,7% 
Global-
ization 
13,4% 82,7% 32,8% 14,3% 83,1% 8,1% 7,4% 22,6% 10,3% 
EEL=Economics, Engineering, Law. 
 
Table 5 shows the aggregated contribution of groups of variables on the first 
two (in the case of India the first three) axes of the fields plotted in Figures 2-5. 
It shows that the trias of engineers, lawyers, and economists is most important 
in the field of elites in Germany, where it is most differentiated and contributes 
to both axes heavily (see the triangular distribution in Figure 2). The differenti-
ation of universities seems to be most distinct in the field of Indian elites, while 
differences in the field careers are most profound in the field of US elites. As 
Table 3 indicates, a field change occurs frequently in the US but is restricted to 
the political elite only and is therefore a major differentiation line.  
The contribution of the globalization variables confirms the assumption of 
the country sampling, that is, the fields of elites in Brazil and the US being 
more national. In this context, globalizing actors in those fields contribute 
strongly to the differentiation of the field. In Germany and India, the transna-
tionalization of elites is more clearly embedded in the central field structures 
itself. That observation leads to the subject of some limitations of the approach 
presented here. Comparative analyses are useful methodological tools, but the 
level of the transnational or global environment is not instantly visible in the 
construction of national fields of power. This is obvious in the case of the US-
field, as its national character results largely from the hegemonic position of 
the USA in the world system, while it affects all other national fields of power 
in the globalized world of the 21st century.  
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5.  Conclusion 
Using MCA, political and economic field elites from the Global North (Ger-
many and the USA) and South (Brazil and India) were analyzed in national 
fields of power. MCA allows to analyze such fields from a comparative and 
explorative perspective using mainly categorical variables derived from the 
qualitative analysis of biographical information but also structural data (for 
example field-specific information like the structure of economies or political 
party affiliations). 
On a conceptual level, a main finding from the comparative analysis is the 
necessity to differentiate between three processes regarding the globalization 
and transnationalization of fields: That is, researchers have to differentiate 
between 1) the degree of transnationalization of the field structure itself 
(“transnational fields”); 2) the degree of transnationalization of the actors and 
their biographical trajectories, and 3) how globalization as an “external” macro-
development affects the relational structure of the field and the strategies of the 
agents (may it be external as an effect of the capitalist world-system or quasi-
external as a multi-level effect of the global field of power). In this context the 
paper has argued that these processes may go in different directions. For exam-
ple, in a very national field, the difference between national and globalized 
elites may shape the field structures heavily, while in a more globalized field, 
this differentiation is not so relevant any more. Furthermore, the paper argues 
that we find a quite similar development in the relation of the several layers of 
the global field of power.  
Capitalist globalization facilitates the proliferation of the “meritocratic 
myth” as a global discourse of the legitimization of power. The top positions in 
very different countries and fields are largely legitimized through cultural capi-
tal today. Therefore, educational institutions of elite recruitment become ever 
more relevant. The increasing relevance of cultural capital can be described as 
a process of global convergence. However, below the surface of capitalist 
discourse specific configurations of local, differentiated, and historical socio-
cultures persist (Rehbein 2011). The notion of homogenous global elite ob-
scures the multiple conflicts within and between such national fields of power 
located within the superstructure of the capitalist world-system. Regarding the 
educational patterns of the elite from a comparative perspective, a central find-
ing of this analysis is that elites in Brazil and India are not as globalized as 
would be expected from their semiperiphal position within the world system. 
Educational elite institutions, especially in the UK and the US certainly play a 
role, but national institutions are far more important than is usually assumed.  
The importance of national configurations is not a paradox or even falsifica-
tion of the globalization hypothesis. Integrating Bourdieusian field theory with 
world-systems theory, it is globalization that is causing a nationalization of 
elite reproduction in the emerging powers, while countries like Brazil and India 
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gain power on the structural level of the world system. Those relations are 
overseen systematically by a sociology of elites that is focused on actor-
centered indicators and restricted to the nation state as the unit of analysis. 
However, this does not mean that the nation state is not important any more, 
especially for elites in national fields of power.  
Based on these arguments and resting on the empirical analysis, this article 
features five central claims regarding field-theoretical elite research in the 
context of globalization:  
1) National elite configurations differ regarding their historical and socio-
cultural formation of cleavages and conflicts in national fields of power. 
The specific impact of globalization depends on these concrete field 
structures on the national level.  
2) Power and influence are relational; that is, the valuation and devaluation 
of transnational capital depends on the structures of national fields of 
power. Instead of starting from the global elite, the analysis should con-
ceptualize “globalizing elites” (Schneickert, Kroneder and Schwab 
2015), since power and legitimacy still stems from national contexts in 
important regards. 
3) The globalization of elites cannot be analyzed within the analytical an-
tagonism between local reproduction and global practices. Quite the con-
trary, it is the dialectic of the national and the global that constitutes what 
may be conceptualized as global fields (Buchholz 2016) or even a global 
field of power (Schmitz, Witte and Gengnagel 2017).  
4) Globalization is not limited to denationalization or transnationalization of 
actors; rather, it implies comprehensive and antagonistic processes, inte-
grating micro and macro levels. A fully integrated field-theoretical ap-
proach should reach from the transnationalization of actors to macro-
historical developments, including the possible return of a multicentric 
world-system (Nederveen Pieterse and Rehbein 2009).  
5) This requires an integration of elites from the Global South (Pelfini 2011, 
2014; Schneickert, Kroneder and Schwab 2015) overcoming the structural 
Eurocentrism of the social sciences that can especially be found in elite 
research. The myth of a global elite (Pelfini 2009; Hartmann 2016) stems 
from this Eurocentrism, underestimating the multiple conflicts and pro-
cesses of differentiation that constitute a global field of power.  
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Appendix 
Table 6: Correlation of Globalization Indicators 
 Non-Citizens Migration Studying Abroad Working Abroad 
Non-Citizens 1    
Migration .60 1   
Studying Abroad .28 .30 1  
Working Abroad .29 .38 .32 1 
 
Table 7: Eigenvalues and Modified Rates (MCA Germany) 
Axis F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 
Eigenvalue 0.172 0.145 0.117 0.093 0.078 0.076 
Modified rates (adj. inertia in %) 38.771 21.027 7.941 1.808 0.189 0.096 
 
Table 8: Contributions of Active Variables (MCA Germany, in Percent) 
Contributions F1 F2 
Law 18.2 0.0 
Economics 6.5 25.7 
Engineering 12.2 19.5 
PhD 2.8 1.5 
University Freiburg 4.6 1.0 
University Göttingen 2.7 0.0 
University Köln 0.5 10.7 
University München 1.0 0.5 
University Münster 0.1 16.6 
TU München 10.2 10.0 
Field Career 8.3 0.0 
Worked Abroad 17.0 0.0 
Studied Abroad 9.6 11.8 
Non-Citizen 6.2 2.5 
Total 100 100 
MCA includes 14 active variables with 28 modalities. Contributions above average for variables 
(7.14%) in bold. 
 
Table 9: Eigenvalues and Modified Rates (MCA Brazil) 
Axis  F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 
Eigenvalue 0.161 0.137 0.118 0.099 0.087 0.072 
Modified rates (adj Inertia in %) 33.538 18.035 9.156 3.075 0.978 0.003 
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Table 10: Contributions of Active Variables (MCA Brazil, in Percent) 
Contributions F1 F2 
Law 11.8 3.4 
Economics 11.5 1.0 
Engineering 7.4 2.1 
PhD 18.3 4.3 
Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro 0.0 1.4 
Universidade de São Paulo 2.2 0.6 
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo 2.1 1.7 
Universidade de Brasília 11.0 1.3 
Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais 4.7 0.5 
Fundação Getúlio Vargas 5.2 0.0 
Field Career 12.3 1.1 
Worked Abroad 9.3 26.3 
Studied Abroad 3.7 27.8 
Non-Citizen 0.4 28.6 
Total 100 100 
MCA includes 14 active variables with 28 modalities. Contributions above average for variables 
(7.14%) in bold. 
 
Table 11: Eigenvalues and Modified Rates (MCA India) 
Axis  F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 
Eigenvalue 0.169 0.149 0.141 0.096 0.094 
Modified rates (adj. inertia in %) 32.172 18.893 14.921 0.744 0.479 
 
Table 12: Contributions of Active Variables (MCA India, in Percent) 
Contributions F1 F2 F3 
Law 25.4 0.9 0.0 
Economics 14.0 1.1 21.5 
Engineering 13.9 4.7 17.7 
PhD 5.8 17.1 0.1 
University of Delhi 3.3 0.1 2.8 
Panjab University 14.6 7.8 0.2 
Indian Institute of Banking and Finance 0.0 15.3 9.5 
University of Mumbai 11.1 0.2 5.2 
NIT/IIT 4.3 4.9 21.1 
Field Career 0.2 25.1 11.7 
Worked Abroad 1.1 12.7 4.4 
Studied Abroad 6.3 9.9 5.9 
Total 100 100 100 
MCA includes 12 active variables with 24 modalities. Contributions above average for variables 
(8.33%) in bold. 
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Table 13: Eigenvalues and Modified Rates (MCA USA) 
Axis F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 
Eigenvalue 0.178 0.139 0.119 0.100 0.083 
Modified rates (adj. inertia in %) 42.458 16.273 7.442 2.135 0.161 
 
Table 14: Contributions of Active Variables (MCA USA, in Percent) 
Contributions F1 F2 
Law 6.1 17.6 
Economics 1.5 7.1 
Engineering 1.8 6.9 
PhD 0.6 3.0 
Stanford 0.4 0.1 
Columbia 2.6 1.0 
Harvard 1.8 17.6 
Yale 1.3 2.5 
Wharton School (UPenn) 0.0 5.1 
Field Career 0.8 30.9 
Worked Abroad 24.6 3.5 
Studied Abroad 26.6 4.3 
Non-Citizen 31.9 0.3 
Total 100 100 
MCA includes 13 active variables with 26 modalities. Contributions above average for variables 
(7.69%) in bold. 
 
Table 15: Parental Occupation (Five-Class-Scheme) 
Class Brazil Germany India USA 

















































Table only includes occupations that appear in the current sample. 
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